SUMMARY: This paper shows how international and local politics influence aid projects, using the example of the Helwan housing project in Cairo funded by the US Government's Agency for International Development (US AID). Most discussions on aid focus on its economic role, neglecting how politics within donor and recipient countries shape it and often limit its effectiveness. Many aid agencies also assume that they can impose conditions to make "their" project more effective without recognizing the resentment and opposition this generates (which then reduces effectiveness). In describing the implementation of this project
I. INTRODUCTION
FOREIGN AID HAS increasingly, over the last three decades, been about donors aiming to change the policies of recipient countries. This is, as many would agree, a highly political exercise. Paradoxically, the aid debate is still very much dominated by an economic rather than a political discussion. What this paper will focus on is the political nature of foreign aid, with particular emphasis on power relations and the way in which politics dominates this relationship. The paper challenges the notion that donors dominate the donor-recipient relationship, showing that recipients can and do hold a great deal of power within the aid relationship. In so doing, it discusses the fact that in this struggle for power and control, donor-led development interventions often fail to meet their pronounced goal, namely, development. This paper will examine these issues in the context of one particular relationship, that of US AID and the government of Egypt (GOE), at a particular time and in one particular case: that of a housing project that was intended to change the housing policy of the GOE. This was the Helwan housing project (1) in an industrial suburb of Cairo. The paper is therefore based on a detailed empirical investigation of this relationship. ( 2) The research (3) examined the political relations between different institutions, the dynamics that they trigger, their influence on the process of a development project and the impact on the populations they were targeting. While some conclusions will be drawn about this particular case study, there is no attempt at generalizations. Questions will be raised as to what extent, with more research in this area, a better understanding of aid relations and their impact on development could be reached.
II. THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID
FOREIGN AID HAS long been the subject of a central debate in the development literature that is still ongoing and is as pertinent today as it has been over the last 50 years. Since its beginnings, the aid debate in the literature has been dominated by an economic discussion, with little consideration of the politics of aid which has mostly been covered in international relations literature. The early development discussions about the role of aid, built on Keynes' theory (1936), were followed by Harrod-Domar's growth model (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) ), Rostow's stages of economic growth (1956) , and Chenery and Strout's two-gap model (1966) . (4) Building on these discussions, a wide-ranging debate on the impact of aid on the economy of recipient countries became the centre of the aid critique, both from the right (5) and from the left. (6) Many have embarked on empirical, mostly quantitative research, to try to prove or disprove that aid results in economic growth in recipient countries. (7) The great majority of studies in this area come to the conclusion that aid seems to have either no impact, or very little, on economic development. The discussion often boils down to the methodologies used in these studies and whether they need to be revised. The latest of such debates is between Darlgaard and Hanssen, and Hansen and Tarp (8) where the argument is whether econometrics is an adequate method.
In the aid debate, the politics of aid has, with few exceptions, (9) been timidly addressed, particularly with respect to donor-recipient relations at the policy, programme and project level at the time of their negotiation and execution. Only in the last ten years or so have some authors been engaged in this discussion. (10) Given that bilateral aid is about a relationship between governments, those of the donor and the recipient, it is inevitable that this relationship is highly political. Focusing on the economic nature of this relationship only explains part of it. Endless research, either on the economic interests of aid or whether foreign aid leads to economic development, does not go far enough to allow an understanding of the reasons why, on the whole, aid does not work. The examination of the politics of aid would shed more light on why aid does or does not reach its development goals.
A number of factors play a role in shaping the relationship between donors and recipients, impacting on donor-led policies, programmes and projects. One of these factors is the way in which the interests of donors and recipients set contradictory goals for aid. The aid literature discusses the interests that both recipients and donors have in foreign aid. However, this discussion often stops at the identification of these interests rather than a more in-depth explanation of their implications. Interests of donors and recipients are important insofar as they help one to understand how much they influence decisions around aid. They are also helpful for understanding what is at stake and how much is invested in the giving and receiving of aid. Most donors readily admit that their involvement in aid is the result of various political and economic interests. The main disagreement they may have with critics of aid is not about whether they do or do not have interests in aid but, rather, to what extent these interests interfere with development goals. "Not only is economic development for the recipient at times viewed by donors as secondary to the pursuit of these objectives but the two can directly conflict on occasion. Pursuit of non-developmental objectiveswhether political, cultural, or commercial -through economic aid can potentially have a seriously detrimental impact on aid effectiveness." (11) Another factor that shapes the aid relationship is the manner in which aid is administered and its inherently interventionist nature, which mostly manifests itself in aid conditionality at project, programme or policy level. These factors will all be analyzed in the light of how they ultimately lead to a relationship where the exercise of power by different actors dominates the process of giving and receiving aid. The important questions here are, how do recipients react to conditionality? And to what extent does sovereignty become an issue? The majority in recipient countries wish their governments to exercise full independent control over all major policy decisions unless control is willingly and voluntarily delegated to others. (12) The tension which arises as a consequence of the interventionist nature of aid is complicated in nature mainly due to the different groups within recipient countries who, to varying degrees, will accept or reject conditionality. The conflict that arises makes the politicization of aid and the exercise of power by various actors in the aid relationship inevitable.
While power is seen as an important dimension in aid relations, it is very rarely given the attention it deserves in the examination of aid. One of the reasons for this is perhaps due to the elusive nature of power as a concept. There have been several attempts at defining and understanding power by different schools of thought such as, for example, the pluralist school, (13) the neo-élitists (14) and the Marxist-structuralists. (15) They, in large, have failed to provide the methodological possibility of examining power relations as a process, changing, dynamic and fluid.
In post-modernism, Foucault's concept of power, although methodologically elusive, provides an extremely important dimension to the understanding of complex and dynamic power relations as examined in this paper. Foucault argues that power:
"...is not to be taken to be a phenomenon of one individual's consolidated and homogenous domination over others, or that of one group or class over others." (16) It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of undergoing and exercising this power". ( Foucault's definition challenges one of the most serious methodological shortcomings of the study of power as a static phenomenon. It also offers a way out of the Marxist-structuralist determinism which assumes that those who have political and economic control have monopoly over power. His analysis offers a very interesting view of the dynamic character of strategies, forms and tactics that dominate power relations. It is the examination of these changing and dynamic forms, tactics and strategies in the process in a particular context that can help most towards an understanding of power relations.
The following case study will illustrate how the politics of aid and the exercise of power and control by various actors in the aid relationship can be one of the main obstacles to achieving development goals. The focus here is less on politics at the level of international relations and more on the way in which it manifests itself with donor and recipient actors, and their interaction in-country.
III. US AID AND THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT (GOE)
US AID's PRESENCE IN Egypt was at its peak in the mid-1970s under President Sadat's régime . In 1975, a decision was made by the US government to give full support to Sadat's policies, namely peace with Israel and the newly introduced "open door policy" by dedicating to Egypt around US$ 1 billion a year in aid. This amount, which is the largest by far given to any country and only equals the amount given to Israel, was the beginning of a somewhat unique relationship between US AID and the government of Egypt (GOE). Another important dimension of this was the US congressional commitment that a fixed amount had to be spent a year. One of the major implications of this yearly commitment, which is still ongoing, is that financial penalties used by donor countries elsewhere do not apply in the case of Egypt. It is one of the major responsibilities of US AID Cairo employees that money in the pipeline must be spent by the end of the financial year; otherwise it is they who have to answer for the delays. "With Washington committed to authorizing more than US$ 1 billion yearly in economic aid, it effectively denies itself an important means of leverage over Egyptian economic policy. AID officials cannot with much conviction threaten to withdraw or withhold funds from the government." (18) However, US aid to Egypt is "tied aid", meaning that projects are chosen on the basis of US AID priorities. They follow a set of conditions; for example, equipment and material have to be procured from the US, and most of the work is done by US consultants and contractors. The aid agreement with Israel is different. The US delivers the whole amount of yearly aid in cash with no interference in how it is spent or managed. (19) With this aid commitment, the US was gaining a new ally in the Middle East. It was a time when Sadat had defied Nasser's foreign policies by initiating a peace treaty with Israel, which cost him his Arab allies. He had also made a full turn towards the West, cutting all ties with the Soviet Union. In addition, he had implemented an "open door policy" to seal his new policy directions. These drastic changes were all presented with a promise of prosperity for all. (20) These policy changes, which took place during the mid-to late 1970s, were welcomed by a small minority of Egyptians, were received with horror by some, and left the majority with 
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a sense of apprehension. There was a general feeling of loss of a cherished national and Arab pride at the same time as a desperate hope for a more economically comfortable future. The United States' major agenda was to prove to the majority of Egyptians that the latter was indeed going to happen because their President has chosen the right path. (21) Accepting that aid is motivated by "political interests abroad and economic interests at home", (22) it becomes quite clear how this influenced the aid relationship of US AID and GOE. In fact, as Ayubi argues:
"The motives of Egyptian aid to Egypt are political in the first place, economic in the second and developmental third. Politically, American aid is in some ways a celebration of the end of Egypt's divorce with Israel. Economically, it helps to promote sales of arms and grain. Yet, mostly to preserve the image, it also has to pay some attention to Egypt's developmental needs." (23) As the case of the Helwan project demonstrates, US AID complied with these priorities "to the teeth". However, while US economic interests in Egypt are substantial, if tested, political and strategic interests take the upper hand.
The Helwan project will also show that aid as an instrument of leverage is often overestimated. The relationship between GOE and US AID is a very good example that supports the point that the greater the wish of the donor to make the recipient dependent, the more dependent the donor becomes. (24) "A donor can come to value the benefits it derives from aid so highly as to make the relationship closer to reciprocal dependency, or interdependency." (25) IV. THE HELWAN PROJECT THE HELWAN PROJECT was one of the largest initiated by US AID in 1976 and was one of the largest US AID-funded projects of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The project, with a budget of US$160 million, was cofunded by the GOE and US AID. The GOE contribution was in the form of land provision for the project. US AID commitment to the project lasted until 1990 but a number of components had not been finalized by then.
Up to this point, the GOE had been predominantly involved in the construction of public housing or "conventional housing" which was, according to the thinking of the time, an inefficient housing solution for low-income populations. The main approach to low-income housing initiatives had been the construction of five-storey-high public housing which often went to middle-rather than low-income people. Such projects, in fact, were never able to meet the huge demand for housing in urban areas. The Helwan project was therefore the first large-scale "non conventional" housing initiative in Greater Cairo. The project, termed a "demonstration project", was located in Helwan in Greater Cairo, an industrial suburb 30 kilometres south of the centre of Cairo. The main goal of the project was to demonstrate the viability of a "new" approach to housing policy in Egypt for low-income households in a manner that would allow the GOE to recover a substantial percentage of its investment. The main policy changes that US AID was seeking were: a switch in the GOE's emphasis from middle-to low-income households; a reduction in subsidies by reducing standards; and encouragement for the mobilization of private savings for investment in housing. (26) There were two main components to the Helwan project: an upgrading and a sites-and-services component. The project was meant to upgrade seven "squatter" communities with a population of around 200,000. The upgrading included the installation of physical and social infrastructure, home improvement loans and small enterprise loans. The sites-and-services component, named Helwan New Community (HNC), was located on unoccupied land that was sub-divided into ten neighbourhoods, including 7,200 plots with infrastructure and services for a projected (27) population of around 100,000. The Helwan project, which was meant to be finalized in 1984, was given an extension until 1988; however, at the time of the research (1989) a number of components were still under completion. One major deviation from the original plan had occurred in 1987, leading to the building of public housing in five of the ten sites-and-services neighbourhoods. This was in direct defiance to the main goal of the project, namely, to change GOE housing policy.
a. The Project Process: Institutional Relations
This section demonstrates the way in which the exercise of power and control by different actors in a highly political set of relationships has influenced the process of the Helwan project. As a result, those who were meant to be served by such a project were not only left with less than they were promised but also, in many cases, with increased hardship. The Initiation and Formulation Phase. At the time of the signature of the Helwan grant agreement, as interviews with both American and Egyptian officials show, not only the US but also the GOE was eager to prove that Sadat's policies would pay dividends. The stakes were high, as the régime did not have popular support and its legitimacy was fragile. The majority of GOE officials at the time felt the GOE had taken serious risks in its new US-supported policies and were therefore hopeful of getting the support needed to deliver to the masses, in order to achieve a much needed legitimacy. There were also those among GOE officials, who disapproved of the new "tilt to the right" and these too needed to be pacified.
Housing, as one of the major unfulfilled needs of the great majority of the urban population, was on the government's priority list. Even though the project was meant to be co funded by US AID and GOE, the latter only had the land to offer and no cash. This meant the GOE made no real financial commitment to the project. Most GOE employees had not yet dealt much with US AID at this stage, so most in the Ministry of Housing were unsure to what extent they had to comply with project conditions without risking the loss of financial support. The fact that the project's approach was one not favoured by the Ministry of Housing seemed irrelevant at this stage. The Ministry of Housing needed the money and it needed the housing units. Egyptian officials involved in signing the agreement did not see fit to openly oppose US AID at this point. While the Minister of Housing, who signed the agreement, might have been open to persuasion, other senior officials in the ministry wanted to keep the status quo. For some, to let go of public housing meant to give up too many vested interests. Others were of the view that the present policy had worked for Egypt and they had no intention of changing this just because "the Americans" wanted it. Questions of sovereignty were important to them. The minister who signed the agreement was shortly replaced by another, who remained in office throughout the history of the project. He had a very clear agenda, that is creating new towns, not upgrading or developing sites-and-services housing.
Other institutions, which were totally marginalized during the early stages of the formulation of the project, such as the Cairo governorate and utility agencies, (28) also had an interest in keeping the status quo. This meant they could maintain their power and control vis-à vis other government institutions concerning land, in the case of the governorate, and infrastructure standards, in the case of the utility agencies. While most knew they had to meet the needs of the low-income populations, they did not see any reason to sacrifice their own approach or their interests. What made their stand easier was that nothing in the legislation or procedures had changed and therefore, by opposing project criteria, they were doing nothing against the rules.
One of US AID conditions was to create a new agency to run the project and, perhaps, future similar projects. The Executive Agency for Joint Projects (29) was created within the Ministry of Housing especially to carry out the project as the government of Egypt implementing agency. Eventually, the Agency found itself responsible for a project that the rest of the Ministry of Housing did not want.
US AID also made sure that a number of American firms were part of the project. The Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) was the American firm hired to give technical advice to the Agency. (30) There were also a number of contracting and constructing firms responsible for the building works. Materials were procured from the US and they were shipped to Egypt on American vessels.
The Design, Planning and Implementation Phase. The design and planning phase of the project was extremely tedious and time-consuming. For the first three to four years of the project, US AID wanted to have full power and control over the project. Their level of involvement was seen by both CHF and the Agency, as well as independent evaluators, to be inappropriate and responsible for the long delays at this stage. Resistance from the Egyptian side started to manifest itself. A good example illustrating the situation was what happened around the review and approval of the upgrading infrastructure plans, a process that took 33 months. According to the grant agreement and project proposal, the infrastructure standards for the project had to be lower than Egyptian standards in order to cut down on costs.
The infrastructure design plans were drawn up by Egyptian and US firms and approved by the Agency, assisted by CHF. Then US AID undertook its own technical review of the sewage plant; for example, its size, cost, specifications and location were appraised. It also made recommendations regarding design and, further, made its approval contingent on the acceptance of those recommendations. (31) The mid-project evaluation reported that, against Agency advice, on a number of occasions US AID had suggested some design changes. These were subsequently rejected by Egyptian utility agencies, causing more delays. (32) The discussion around US AID's level of control in the project started when, in one of the coordination meetings, the then vice-chairman of the Agency raised the following questions:
"Project success requires team work. What role does AID play in the team? Policy? Technical advice? Monitoring? When does AID have the "right'" to participate? And when should it wait for an invitation? Which subjects should our consultants discuss with AID and which only with permission from the Agency?" (33) Complaints about US AID's desire to be at all times in full control of the project were also voiced by CHF staff. A senior staff member informed the project's first external evaluators that US AID requested CHF to share work plans and programme concept papers with US AID for review and comment prior to submission to the Agency. Typically, such requests, when granted, were followed by instructions on how work should proceed or in what form a programme component should be structured. This use of CHF to control project direction, a CHF official complained, put CHF in an awkward situation with its client [the Agency]. As a response, the then Agency chairman requested that CHF respond to US AID inquiries only when put on paper. (34) Even though the Agency's raison d'être was to implement the Helwan project and, implicitly, to do it according to the grant agreement, i.e. the way US AID wanted, the Agency started demonstrating through subtle acts of defiance that it was not going to accept the patron-client relationship that US AID meant to establish. The Agency, as a newly developed organization, would never have had the power to defy US AID had it not had the backing of the Ministry of Housing which was, in fact, hostile to the project. The fact that there was a signed grant agreement approving lower standards held no power over utility agencies whose procedures and guidelines had been unchanged for decades. The Agency was able to use this to its advantage. Along with the Ministry of Housing, it agreed with the position of the utility agencies. This was the first challenge to US AID. US AID's failure to find -or choice not to find -another channel to put pressure on the utility agencies led US AID to realize that it did not have the authority over GOE that it thought it had. This was a time when the Agency and the Ministry of Housing were starting to acquire more knowledge of US AID's limitations.
During the implementation of the upgrading component, US AID mainly relied on CHF and other American and Egyptian firms to carry out the work. With its expertise limited mostly to infrastructure, it took a back seat in terms of the other components of the project. The Agency, on the other hand, while equally uninformed about upgrading, wanted to be part of every decision. It felt this was its first real chance to be in control of the project. Most of its need to control was exercised in a top-down fashion in its dealings with the communities, giving very little leeway for negotiation or sharing in decision-making.
The provision of land tenure was one of the main project objectives of the upgrading component. However, the project failed to achieve it. This was another example of a case where different interests collided and where US AID chose not to, or found it impossible to, intervene. Basically, the governorate, which is the public sector agency owning the land in the squatter areas, refused to give land titles to homeowners. The position of the Agency on this matter was ambiguous. While, in general, the employees knew that securing land tenure was a pivotal part of the upgrading approach, at another level the majority felt the "squatters" had no rights to the land. They saw this as possibly the beginning of huge demands all over Cairo for the same kind of treatment. However, the Agency once again did not have to take a stand on this, as it was the governorate that was refusing. US AID also did not exercise its power, if indeed it had any in this area, to force the matter to be resolved. Had the issue of land tenure come up earlier in the project process, it is not clear how the results would have been different. There was a level of learning between and among different institutions during the project process which meant that the limits of exercising their own will without causing major confrontation had been established. This left the land tenure issue in the hands of a small number of CHF consultants who were adamant in their pursuit of its resolution.
When it came to the Helwan New Community (HNC), the major departure here was in flagrant defiance of the major goal of the projectthe reversion to conventional housing in half of the neighbourhoods. The Minister of Housing, who had refused to visit the project for the first three years in office, on his first visit gave the verbal order to build public housing. Because this is what the majority of Agency employees really wanted from the start, they presented this decision to US AID and CHF as a fait-accompli. US AID, again put in a corner after delays and various engineering mistakes made by American firms, as well as the pressure of money in the pipeline, let the Egyptians go ahead.
As the implementation of the HNC progressed, the conditions were in the making that would allow the whole purpose of the HNC to be undermined. Meeting the conditions of hiring US firms and importing US goods resulted in long delays and high costs. There were direct and predictable reasons for the delays and costs, such as the lengthy GOE bureaucratic complexities related to the importation of materials, their high cost and their transportation. There were also unpredictable reasons for the delays, such as the choice of the site and a problem with building foundations in difficult soil conditions. There was also the inadequate division of responsibility between Egyptian and American firms in the construction. Another major problem was that of the excavation of the infrastructure connection modules which were designed for sites-and-services and not for public housing which had to be built on the same site.
Unlike the upgrading component of the project, in the HNC the Agency was more or less marginalized from the main decision-making process for the first five years of the project. It seems that the objections they made about construction techniques were not heard by US AID as it went along with the American choice of technique. This raises the question of whether these objections were made loud enough to be heard. Then, during a stage of the project when the technical solution chosen by US AID proved inadequate, it found itself in a weak position. It was then that the visit from the Minister of Housing tilted the balance in favour of the Agency's preference for conventional housing. At last, the latter were in control and US AID accepted the decision: there were huge amounts of money blocked in the pipeline which had to be spent. Also the media (35) in the US was starting to use Egypt, and particularly the Helwan project, as an example of US AID inefficiency and members of Congress were pouring in to visit the project. They wanted to see results. All of these events were successfully used by the Ministry of Housing and the Agency to advance their own goals.
A later stage of the project showed that, while different strategies as well as different forms of power were exercised all along, in the end a more stable relationship emerged which took on a very particular character. While the Agency was critical of their colleagues in the Ministry of Housing for not being tough negotiators at the time of signing the grant agreement, they, in fact, were not doing any better. There was never any open negotiation with US AID nor with CHF about the way the Agency really "wanted out" of the original concept of the project. Their power lay in manipulation, (36) often through passive resistance, whilst US AID's power was "dormant", (37) which tilted the power balance towards the Egyptians. This was a perfect match for a non-confrontational, mistrusting and subversive relationship which ended up in a most unsatisfactory Mistrust was rife and accusations about all sorts of misconduct between different actors were common. Underlying all this was basically a lack of understanding and knowledge of each other. US AID and Agency officials accused each other of corruption, nepotism, inefficiency, dishonesty and ignorance. They were, in general, not able to talk to each other; they felt they spoke totally different languages. What neither the Agency nor US AID realized was that, in fact, they had more in common than they thought. One very important similarity was their perception of the poor, and it is this perception that was perhaps most influential in the project's approach to the target groups. The majority of senior staff in both US AID and the Agency saw the main aim of the project as a means to pacify what they perceived as potentially politically threatening sections of the population. To meet some of their needs would stabilize a potentially dangerous situation. Very little was said in interviews and discussions about social equity, citizenship or human rights.
b. Impact of the Project on the HNC and Upgrading Populations
The contradictions between the policies, approaches and interests of the different government, donor and public sector actors in the project produced results that, in the main, went against the interests of another set of actors, namely, the target populations. Delays in implementation were among the most damaging effects of the project on the target population. Although Egyptian bureaucracy is known for delays, this case was particular in that it was primarily a deliberate delay. The Agency had time on its hands; it was not in its interests to get the project finished. It was created to run the project and other similar projects but there were none in the pipeline. In stalling, it knew that it was putting the squeeze on US AID, who wanted to see results, reaching a point where they did not care what results these were. Other Egyptian institutions had no reason to rush the procedure. They had no interest in this project and, therefore, sat on decisions for long periods of time. US AID, in following its own bureaucratic procedures, also caused long delays especially at the beginning of the project. CHF did not want to see the project end quickly either. Its contract was tied to the completion of the project and therefore had no fixed deadline.
There were undoubtedly some very tangible negative impacts on the target population. Perhaps most were unavoidable. (38) Perhaps, had the inhabitants not been included in the project at all, they would have had an even worse deal. However, they were part of a government project, funded by the "Americans". They were part of a project that promised a great deal; among other things, land tenure, access to infrastructure and affordable good quality housing.
The impact of the project on the upgrading population in Rashed, (39) one of the upgrading areas, was different from that of the HNC. The most observable difference is that, while the project had a direct impact on the inhabitants of the HNC, for the majority in the upgrading community, it had an indirect impact. However, because, unlike the HNC, the project was dealing with an established community, its impact on inter-and intracommunity group relations was more potent here.
In the upgrading communities, for example in Rashed, land tenure, as mentioned above, was still not resolved for the upgrading communities 
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38. Most non-conventional housing schemes of this era faced problems of eligibility criteria, affordability, cost recovery and displacement among others. What is, however, particular to the Helwan project is that it managed to combine the problems of both20 years into the project. Last inquiries into this matter, in 1996, indicate that a compromise might have been reached at last but there was still no certainty that it was going to be implemented. The impact of the delay in implementing land tenure raises ambiguous questions. On the one hand, land tenure was the most attractive part of the project for homeowners, as their property was finally going to be made legal. Not getting land tenure not only affected this sense of security, since land ownership was meant to have been used as collateral, but also resulted in limiting eligibility to loans, mainly to formal sector employees. According to some self-help theorists, (40) land tenure in squatter areas leads to the commodification of housing and puts it "beyond the pockets of the poor"; in this case, the simple promise of land tenure achieved this. Moreover, the combination of receiving loans and improving housing without legal tenure was the best condition possible for homeowners to get rid of low-paying tenants. The latter had few legal rights since they, by proxy, were considered illegal tenants. Displacement of the poorest, which is perhaps inevitable, seemed to have occurred on an especially wide scale.
In the HNC, the inhabitants of Neighbourhood 5 (41) were given only de jure land ownership. Six homeowners share the ownership of the land on which their block is built. (42) The initial approach to the HNC, that is, sitesand-services, offered the possibility for vertical expansion -giving opportunities for extra income if owners chose to rent out those extra units or offering the possibility of housing to younger generations. In that case, land would be owned by individual households. Since buyers were not given the right to choose which type of housing they received, the opportunity for land ownership was lost to those who were allocated flats in Neighbourhood 5 public housing blocks.
Since the plots were already sub-divided and serviced, the decision made by the Agency was that the size of the apartments would remain as planned. This meant that what was seen as an appropriate size for the ground floor of a house became the size of the flat. This made them by far the smallest public housing flats in the area, when compared to neighbouring public housing flats built over the last three decades. In addition, because of the rush to build them and the available budget, there were also many design and construction problems. At this stage, the buyers had very little choice in terms of turning down the flats, having already waited an average of five to six years from the time they were promised housing. In other words, had the project been "conventional" housing from the start, the units would have been bigger, probably better built and, above all, they would have been ready much earlier. Most problematic of all was the increased price of the units and the debts and economic pressures the monthly instalments created. Again, this was a direct result of the delays in the project and the rise in costs of materials, labour, etc. In 1986, the buyers of the finished flats were told that they would have to pay a certain amount as a first instalment and then pay the rest of the cost of the flats in monthly instalments. By the time they received the flats two years later, the price of both the first and monthly instalments had gone up by around 150 per cent. This, according to the flat buyers, was more than they could afford, causing real economic hardship and resulting in some getting into serious debt.
Compared to the HNC, the financial burden which the project put upon Rashed inhabitants seems less dramatic. With cost recovery as one of the conditions of the project, home improvement loans had to be repaid at market level interest rates. Home improvement loans were provided to 41. This was one of the five neighbourhoods of the HNC (ten in all) which was built as public housing and where the research for this paper took place.
42. In the original idea for sites-and-services, the price of the land, i.e. its ownership, was included in the price set for the site of the unit to be built by the buyers. This remained the case for the flat buyers. However, because the land is shared with another five owners, obviously they have no individual control over the land.
homeowners, and renters were therefore excluded. The homeowners who did receive loans and who had tenants raised their rents above the means of most tenants. The result was that a large number of the latter lost their housing in Rashed. (43) Another element of cost recovery was the plan to collect the cost of the infrastructure in the upgrading areas. By the official end of the project, this plan had not been implemented largely because the infrastructure was still not in full operation. Some inhabitants in Rashed did, however, pay for the installation of infrastructure in side streets. A more indirect financial impact was the burden of the cost of house improvements on those who chose, during the construction boom, to carry out building works paid through informal loans. However, the opportunity to improve housing conditions was in place and did give some positive results. Local contractors, as well as builders, also benefitted a great deal from the boom.
In terms of infrastructure, despite a number of problems, there was some improvement in Rashed's physical environment. However, the sewage system was non-functional, the garbage collection system worked only for a few weeks and water connections were only accessible to those living on the main streets and those who could pay for extensions to side streets. In the case of the inhabitants of HNC, the infrastructure, although already showing faults, was working.
The project also had an impact on the intra-and inter-community group relations. In Rashed, the project has had quite a detrimental impact at different levels. Some of the Agency and CHF employees who dealt directly with Rashed seemed to have had no problem allying themselves with the most powerful in the community at the expense of the least powerful. They provided the conditions by which landlords were given carte blanche to advance their interests at the expense of the renters. They supported one leadership against another rival leadership, increasing the political conflict which already existed in Rashed. They dealt only with men and largely left out women. They played on already existing exploitative and competing relationships in order to keep control of a complex process that they were, in fact, inexperienced in handling. They defined community participation as the participation of leaders and, within this limited definition of participation, they even neglected to identify and seek legitimate representation. There was never a chance for real negotiation or space for expressing the needs and interests of different groups in the community.
In the HNC, again, there were no lines of communication established for flat buyers to discuss matters with Agency staff. The latter acted in a dictatorial manner and looked upon the occupiers of the flats with suspicion -as a potential source of trouble. Perhaps it was too much to expect that something different would take place in the Helwan project, in a society where democracy is so curtailed at all levels -a society where to challenge authority is far from the norm. However, given that the Helwan project was meant to be a "demonstration" project, it was a lost opportunity to try something different.
Both target groups experienced the project as a confirmation of the way their government treats the poor. Because of the different kinds of relationships and different experiences that occurred during the project, the Rashed and HNC populations had slightly different views of this. In Rashed, the resentment was mostly about what they saw as the desire of Agency, the government representative in the project, to make a profit from the poor through high interest rate loans. This often raised discus- sions about what is seen as the Agency's greed and corruption and how it makes its money out of the poor rather than the rich. There was also resentment, especially from the tenants, about how the government institutions often supported those who "have" against those who do not. The loans were very much seen as an example of this pattern. No one in authority was considered to be sympathetic to the plight of tenants who, because of the loans, were either paying extra rent, being harassed to do so or had lost their housing altogether.
HNC residents' major resentment was the price of the units. In both communities, the government was accused of making promises and not delivering. Discussions were triggered about how the situation of the poor is always in decline and that this is because government does not care. Education was most often given as an example -of how inaccessible education has become and how the present government institutions were returning to pre-revolutionary Egypt policies when the poor were "to be kept in their place".
There were different views about the US, none of them very passionate. They were mostly accused of wanting to keep the "Third World" as it is and seeing its populations as less than human. They were seen as nonbelievers who promoted loans with interest and who did not respect privacy in housing design, both basically anti-Islamic concepts. In these cases, however, the ultimate blame was aimed at the GOE which "should know better" and not accept such conditionalities. However, the general view was that this followed the pattern of all government institutions, which "...just do whatever the Americans ask them to do."
The notion that the GOE does everything the US wants it to do -that the GOE is totally powerless in this relationship -is shared by the great majority of Egyptians including those considered to be well-informed on Egyptian affairs. The accuracy of this notion, as this paper is trying to demonstrate, will need to be re-assessed. What was most interesting in following the way in which the project evolved was that it shows that all actors, most of all the Egyptians, had potential power. Some chose to use it, others did not. This choice was part of an overall strategy, perhaps not always conscious, of prioritizing interests at a particular point in time. It is this fluidity and movement of power that makes Foucault's analysis relevant.
V. WHAT DOES THIS CASE TELL US ABOUT POLITICS IN AID?
THIS CASE STUDY demonstrates two important and related issues. The first is that closer attention needs to be paid to the politics of aid, both with a big "P" and a small "p". The second is that, as mentioned earlier in the paper, when aid is motivated by political concerns, development concerns are often sacrificed. In a study of US AID, Rossiter distinguishes between development goals and strategic goals that govern aid administration. He proposes that the confusion between the two levels of goals accounts for the failure of economic aid to achieve its developmental goals. He explains that development mandates and diplomatic policies are in conflict in US foreign assistance programmes. The US foreign assistance mandate started in 1962 by making no distinction between diplomatic-strategic and humanitarian-development goals. (44) The later mandate of 1973, while more development-oriented, still did not manage to remove US AID from the control of the State Department, which is motivated largely by diplomatic and strategic goals. (45) US AID headquarters, while protecting economic interests such as jobcreation and promoting industry at home, as well as respecting political interests also had to deal with development goals -as long as it did not compromise their other interests. Part of their development agenda in the 1970s and early 1980s was to promote self-help housing. So their purpose in funding the Helwan housing project was a change in GOE housing policy. When the different GOE institutions resisted the US AID policy agenda, the latter were unwilling to withdraw or stop funds dedicated to the Helwan project. US AID could not put in jeopardy what they perceived as their more important economic and political goals.
US AID in-country is, above all, the financial manager of these programmes, with the money to spend in the pipeline. Unlike at US AID headquarters, there was no expertise on self help-housing in the US AID Cairo office and no real political will to support this approach. There was, however, the motivation to protect the conditions of the grant agreement. The latter seemed not to be enough for US AID officials to cause a political confrontation with the GOE.
The important role of the American technical consultant, engineering and contracting firms as well as the various industries providing material cannot be denied. While their interests were primarily economic, they rarely wanted to jeopardize their position vis-à-vis the host country or go against the political interests of their own government. This inevitably politicized their interaction with all actors. In the case of Helwan, CHF was in no doubt about this position. Although most employees, both American and Egyptian, had a political commitment to self-help housing and various levels of technical expertise in the approach, their position made them both powerful and powerless. They were powerful as gobetweens and powerless to influence the project process to follow the selfhelp approach more closely. US AID in-country, as mentioned above, had no real knowledge of housing and the Agency wanted to revert to the conventional approach. At the same time, the CHF main office in the US was mostly interested in the financial returns. From a professional point of view, this left CHF staff members in Egypt without allies.
Since the late 1980s, the US has periodically been threatening to stop its yearly aid commitment to Egypt -a threat that still has not materialized. The US goal for giving this aid to Egypt is still the same as it was in the mid-1970s. To a large extent, this aid is still placed under the umbrella of "peace dividend". While this is rarely discussed by the US or the GOE, Israel does occasionally make a statement referring to this fact. Since the mid-1990s, relations between Egypt and Israel have taken a turn for the worse mostly due to Egypt's justifiably hard line against Israel's policies towards the Palestinian and other neighbouring Arab countries, especially Lebanon. As a result, Israel has complained to the US that Egypt is violating the spirit of the peace treaty signed between the two countries and therefore "aid for peace" should be withdrawn. (46) As economic hardship and inequality has increased in the last two decades, the rise of political Islam has become a further issue in US-GOE relations. Western countries, including the US, increasingly see this as a real threat to their interests both in the Middle East and abroad. Acts of terrorism by Islamic groups against tourists in Egypt as well as in the US and Europe has brought this reality dangerously close to home. This is yet another reason why a withdrawal of economic support from the US to other contexts. There is no doubt that the strategic position of Egypt and its unique aid contract with the US AID makes it a unique case. Nevertheless, this paper is trying to illustrate not only how one set of aid relations can give insight into the functioning of a particular context, in this case Egypt, but also elsewhere.
Most people, including aid specialists, politicians and the general public, assume that recipients of aid are powerless. Until their analysis of aid is challenged through different case studies such as the one presented here, an important part of the understanding of aid relations and how this affects donor-led development will be missed.
